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1. INTRODUCTION
Over recent years self-employment has re-
ceived a great deal of attention, both from aca-
demic researchers and policy makers. This is in
part explained by the growth of the proportion of
workers who are self-employed observed in sev-
eral countries in the last decade, notably Germany,
Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, Portugal, and
Sweden (see Tables 1 and 2).
A set of overlapping reasons has been put for-
ward for this recent growth in the self-employ-
ment share. Traditionally, economists relate self-
employment growth with the deterioration of la-
bour market conditions. However, more recently,
researchers have been stressing out other reasons
such as: the market reaction to overly rigid labour
and product markets and the high level of taxa-
tion; changes in industrial organisation; the avail-
ability of new employment opportunities in OECD
economies; and special policies directed to foster
self-employment entry (see Manser and Picot
(1999) and OECD (2000) for a detailed analysis of
recent self-employment growth)(1).
This paper explores the role of non-agricultural
self-employment as a close alternative to paid-
employment, and as the response to labour market
policies that affect the opportunity cost of entering
and remaining self-employed, such as employ-
ment protection legislation and compulsory con-
tributions to the social security system made by
the self-employed(2).
This paper is the first attempt to shed some
light on the interaction of labour market rigidity
with variables capturing the cost of being self-
employed, when evaluating the role of self-
employment in highly regulated labour markets.
Using panel data evidence from a set of OECD
countries, I inquire whether different policy vari-
ables affecting both demand and supply for
self-employment matches can explain the recent
evolution of the employment structure in these
countries.
My results indicate that the finding of a posi-
tive relationship between labour market rigidity
and the share of self-employment is sensitive to
the inclusion of more variables capturing the costs
of entering (and remaining in) self-employment.
Proxying these costs with the ratio of social secu-
rity contributions per self-employed to the nomi-
nal GDP per capita, I find a non-linear relationship
between flexibility and self-employment share.
The main result is that higher social security
contributions by the self-employed reduce the
ability of labour market rigidity to explain self-
employment. Therefore, the role of self-employ-
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(1) Previous studies on self-employment have stressed the socio-
logical and psychological characteristics of the self-employed
and investigated its role in providing jobs for the unemployed,
most papers analysing the relationship between unemploy-
ment and self-employment rates. These studies include both
micro and aggregate level analyses such as those by Evans and
Leighton (1989), Blanchflower and Meyer (1992), Meager
(1992), and, more recently, Borjas (1999), Carrasco (1999), and
Blanchflower (2000).
(2) In some countries there has been the concern that taxation sys-
tems and other labour market policies might have encouraged
the development of ‘’false’’ self-employment. This kind of em-
ployment arrangement is characterised by working conditions
very similar to those in paid-employment, but workers declare
themselves as self-employed simply to reduce tax liabilities or
employers responsibilities.38 Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / December 2000
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Table 1
SHARE OF NON-AGRICULTURAL SELF-EMPLOYMENT ON CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT
1984 -1998
Per cent
1984 1989 1994 1996 1997 1998
Germany.............. 7.55 7.77 8.46 8.99 9.25 9.36
Australia.............. 12.45 12.87 12.54 11.82 12.87 11.79
Austria ............... 7.92 6.57 6.63 6.89 7.05 7.37
Belgium............... 12.46 12.89 13.90 14.12 14.12 13.90
Canada ............... 7.39 7.19 9.05 9.54 10.13 n.a.
Denmark.............. 7.64 6.90 6.76 7.11 6.71 6.95
Spain ................. 17.95 17.58 18.69 18.49 18.12 17.61
United States .......... 7.63 7.51 7.50 7.25 7.16 6.97
Finland ............... 6.87 8.65 9.90 10.26 10.00 10.00
France ................ 10.50 10.47 8.80 8.51 8.58 8.17
Greece ............... 27.26 27.18 28.03 27.48 27.00 n.a.
Ireland................ 11.45 12.92 13.57 12.82 12.93 13.40
Italy .................. 21.38 22.39 22.29 22.97 22.74 22.74
Japan ................. 13.00 12.04 10.08 9.69 9.69 9.66
Norway............... 6.79 6.38 6.12 5.46 5.39 5.35
New Zealand .......... 13.89 14.65 15.81 15.72 15.70 16.86
Netherlands ........... 8.68 7.75 9.36 9.77 9.99 9.68
Portugal .............. 16.90 16.43 19.18 19.84 19.13 n.a.
United Kingdom ....... 10.22 12.37 11.99 11.75 11.71 11.40
Sweden ............... 4.66 7.06 8.97 9.12 9.05 9.00
Switzerland ........... 10.18 10.02 9.72 9.65 9.66 9.65
.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2000).
n.a.: Data not available.
Table 2
CONTRIBUTION OF NON-AGRICULTURAL SELF-EMPLOYMENT TO TOTAL JOB
GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN









Boom............................... 1978-82 114 344 33.14
Recession ........................... 1983-85 -27 -83 32.53
Boom............................... 1985-91 164 692 23.70
Recession ........................... 1992-93 -176 -214 82.42
Boom............................... 1993-97 58 69 84.06
Spain:
Recession ........................... 1977-85 110 -1039 -10.59
Boom............................... 1985-91 384 2576 14.91
Recession ........................... 1991-94 27 -569 -4.10
Boom............................... 1994-97 136 1042 13.05
United States:
Recession ........................... 1981-82 163 -871 -18.71
Boom............................... 1982-90 1199 19266 6.22
Recession ........................... 1990-91 177 -1075 -16.47
Boom............................... 1989-96 239 11839 2.02
Canada:
Recession ........................... 1981-82 18 -289 -6.12
Boom............................... 1982-90 231 2144 10.77
Recession ........................... 1990-92 42 -290 -14.48
Boom............................... 1992-97 367 1089 33.70
Source: OECD, Quarterly Labour Force Statistics (several issues).ment in making those rigidities less severe it’s
only present in countries in which these contribu-
tions do not act as a barrier to self-employment en-
try.
These results illustrate a key drawback of pre-
vious research on self-employment and market ri-
gidities, which is the failure to identify the broad
effect of labour market policies on the structure of
employment. In fact, to analyse the total effect of
different labour market policies and/or outcomes
(for example, firing costs, compulsory contribu-
tions, unemployment, and inequality), researchers
need to think carefully about how self-employ-
ment (and other labour market variables) is going
to respond to these policies and/or outcomes. Too
often, people just think of self-employment as an-
other form of underemployment (a close substi-
tute to unemployment), rather than self-employ-
ment being a close substitute to dependent em-
ployment.
The policy implications of these results are
quite important. Since different policies affect
self-employment in different ways, they can undo
the effect of each other in such a way that omitting
one of them leads us wrongly to conclude that
they have no effect. Policies that act as a barrier to
self-employment entry might prevent those who
potentially foster self-employment to have per-
ceivable effects. Thus if somehow one makes more
expensive to enter and operate a business, this is
expected to crowd out the effect of labour market
rigidities on self-employment entry, and thus, to
magnify their impact on different labour market
outcomes, such as, for example, the unemploy-
ment rate.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 reviews the literature on labour market
flexibility and the determinants of self-employ-
ment. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and
the evidence obtained using a panel of 18 OECD
countries and section 4 concludes.
2. SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTION
The argument that relates self-employment and
employment protection is not a new one. Some
findings of this kind are reported in Grubb and
Wells (1993), OECD (1999), and, more recently, in
Robson (2000).
The first study presents simple correlation coef-
ficients between an index of employment protec-
tion and the structure of employment. It identifies
some tendency for self-employment to be higher
in countries which have stricter regulations while
employment/population ratios are negatively cor-
related with employment protection(3). This posi-
tive association (possibly non-linear) between the
ranking of employment protection and the rate of
self-employment is shown in Chart 1, that plots
the self-employment rate against the OECD’s in-
dex of employment protection (using data from
the late 80’s).
The explanation put forward for this result is
that employers may attempt to circumvent the ef-
fects of regulations on their ability to hire and fire
employees by contracting-out self-employed
workers.
Besides addressing the labour demand incen-
tives for hiring self-employed workers, this argu-
ment also relates to the opportunity cost of enter-
ing self-employment. On the one hand, while em-
ployment protection legislation reduces the flows
into paid-employment, it also decreases the oppor-
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(3) I computed the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (S)b e -
tween the index of employment protection (OECD (1999)) and
the self-employment rate. The value obtained for S was 0.5398.
Under the null hypotheses of independence the mean of S is
equal to zero, the significance value obtained for the test of in-
dependence between the employment protection index and the
self-employment rate is 0.0140, meaning that there is a true as-
sociation between these two variables.
Chart 1
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etunity cost of entering self-employment, since it re-
duces the expected income stream of future paid-
employment matches. On the other hand, how-
ever, this reduction affects specially those who
fare worst in the labour market, and face lower
prospectus of being offered a paid-employment
position. This implies that it can be magnified by
other factors affecting the likelihood of a worker
making a transition into self-employment, spe-
cially those related with income formation in self-
employment.
It has been argued elsewhere (Pfeiffer and
Reize (2000)) that the threshold of the income
stream at which a decision in favour of self-
employment is made depends on the previous ex-
perience of the worker. However, this threshold
would also be affected by the tax and contributory
systems in place at the time a worker faces the de-
cision to enter self-employment. Systems that are
financially more demanding would raise this
threshold and act as a barrier to self-employment
entry, specially for those with lower levels of ex-
pected income.
In the empirical application made in this paper,
I use the differences across time and countries in
social security contributions paid by the self-
employed (along with the degree of labour market
flexibility) to explain differences in the self-em-
ployment share. Most OECD countries (more no-
tably European ones), have introduced compul-
sory social security contribution systems since the
80’s. While these systems aimed at insure self-
employed workers in a similar fashion as those in
paid employment, they introduced a barrier to
self-employment entry, especially for low income
workers. If self-employment composition is made
of the so-called ‘’false’’ type, this will act as a
transfer of the burden of contributions from the
employer to the worker. Some countries created
specific systems to the self-employed, while in
other countries self-employed workers were in-
cluded in the general system. However, in most
cases this represented a substantial increase in
self-employed contributions (see Chart 2) since, to
prevent income under-report, in almost every case
minimum compulsory levels of contributions were
defined independently of the workers’ activity
level (see Schoukens (1999) for a detailed descrip-
tion of all the European systems)(4).
3. THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
CONTRIBUTIONS AND LABOUR MARKET
RIGIDITIES
In order to study the effect of labour market ri-
gidity and self-employed social security contribu-
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where SE is the share of self-employment, LMF is
the index of labour market flexibility, SSC is the
level of social security contributions paid by the
self-employed and X is a vector of other cova-
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(4) Cross country comparisons of the financing of social security
systems for the self-employed is an extremely hard task. This
is because of the differences in the mechanisms used to deter-
mine the income basis and in the areas covered which are
never completely the same. This makes the comparison of per-
centages of contributions of little use. The Spanish and Portu-
guese cases are simpler to compare because the minimum
income basis are easier to determine and the systems cover ba-
sically the same areas (if anything, the Portuguese system was
more generous in some periods). In 1996, the ratio of the mini-
mum compulsory social security contributions to the mini-
mum wage in Portugal is half those in Spain. In that year,
minimum contributions to the social security system were 45
per cent of the minimum wage in Spain and only 23 per cent in
Portugal. This is due to both a lower contributory percentage
and a lower minimum level of income basis.riates. I included country () and time specific ef-
fects () in order to control for omitted variables
bias.
The interaction term captures possible non-
linearities in the impact of labour market flexibil-
ity and social security contributions on self-
employment share. As stated above, it is likely
that, since the first variable is directed to capture
the demand for self-employment and the second
the supply side of the market, their full impact on
self-employment cannot be captured if they enter
only in levels. Also note that the force of labour
market rigidities may be non-linear. It can be ar-
gued that, for a given firm, once these rigidities
get large enough, no firing occurs and self-
employment becomes more important, which im-
plies a non-linear rigidity effect. Thus, in some
specifications I include the square of LMF.
The results of estimating equation (1) using a
fixed-effects estimator are presented in Table 3(5).
The set of control variables includes flexibility
squared, and the interaction term with social secu-
rity contributions. In line with previous research
on self-employment share I also include the loga-
rithm of GDP and the unemployment rate(6).These
two variables were consistently found significant
in previous studies on self-employment. The level
of GDP per capita has been found by Acs,
Audretsch and Evans (1994) to have a significant
negative impact on the share of non-agricultural
self-employment in a sample of OECD countries.
The explanation put forward for these results is
that a rise in the level of GDP per capita is associ-
ated with a decline in the returns to self-
employment relative to those from paid-employ-
ment. A number of studies also find that the share
of self-employment is negatively related with the
unemployment rate, as is the case of Blanchflower
(2000).
All coefficients are significantly different from
zero. However, the more important result is the
coefficient on the interaction term. Being positive,
it indicates that more flexibility reduces the impact
of lower social security contributions in fostering
self-employment growth, but more notable, higher
social security contributions reduces the ability of
labour market rigidity to explain the self-employ-
ment share. For sufficiently high values of contri-
butions, the flexibility variable has an impact no
longer significantly different from zero.
Note also, that the impact of the flexibility vari-
able is non-linear. For smaller values of the flexi-
bility indicator the impact on self-employment in-
cidence is larger.
These results are important in two respects.
First, they explain the partial failure of previous
research (OECD (1999) and Robson (2000)) to find
a consistently significant relationship between la-
bour market flexibility and self-employment.
These studies did not consider the non-linearities
in this relationship and omitted the role of other
policy variables affecting the supply of self-
employment matches. Secondly, the policy impli-
cations of these results are quite important. Since
different policies affect self-employment in differ-
ent ways, they can undo the effect of each other in
such a way that omitting one of them lead us
wrongly to conclude that they have no effect. Pol-
icies that act as a barrier to self-employment entry
might prevent those who potentially foster self-
employment to have perceivable effects.
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Table 3
THE DETERMINANTS OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT
RATE: 18 OECD COUNTRIES 1984-1997






Social Security Contributions ............. -0.186
(0.071)




Log GDP per capita ...................... -0.136
(0.028)
Unemployment rate ..................... -0.001
(0.0006)
F – test................................. 9.07
Number of observations ................. 2 4 8
Notes:
Variables are defined in the data appendix.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
(5) Detailed results are available from the author upon request.
(6) Other variables were included but proved to be statistically
non-significant in this regression.4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I explore the role of self-employ-
ment as a close alternative to paid-employment
and as a response to labour market policies that af-
fect the opportunity cost of entering and remain-
ing self-employed, such as employment protection
legislation and compulsory contributions to the
social security system made by the self-employed.
I present empirical evidence on a panel of
OECD countries showing that the positive rela-
tionship between labour market rigidity and the
share of self-employment is sensitive to the inclu-
sion of more variables capturing the costs of enter-
ing (and surviving) self-employment. Proxying
these costs with the level of social security contri-
butions paid by the self-employed (as a fraction of
per capita GDP) I find a non-linear relationship be-
tween flexibility and the self-employment share.
There are important policy implications of
these results. Since different policies affect self-
employment in different ways, they can undo the
effect of each other in such a way that omitting
one of them lead us wrongly to conclude that they
have no effect. Policies that act as a barrier to
self-employment entry might prevent those who
potentially foster self-employment to have per-
ceivable effects.
In a model of the labour market in which paid-
and self-employment decisions are simultaneous,
the above results point to the importance of
self-employment as a key channel of labour mar-
ket flexibility, increasing market flows and crowd-
ing-out the effects of employment protection legis-
lation.
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The flexibility data used in this paper come
from the World Competitiveness Report (WCR).
This is an annual survey that requests the opinion
of a number of managers on, among many other
questions, the flexibility of enterprises to adjust
things like compensation and employment levels
to economic realities in their countries. Di Tella
and MacCulloch (1999) present a detailed descrip-
tion of these data and compare them with other la-
bour market flexibility data. They find the WCR
data to be highly correlated with the OECD mea-
sure. The data also capture most changes in em-
ployment protection legislation occurred in Euro-
pean countries over the sample period and coded
in Saint-Paul (1996).
This paper covers the period from 1984 to 1997,
which is considerably larger than the one used in
previous studies. Despite all the criticism associ-
ated with the usage of survey (and subjective) data
I think these data are still worth using given the
larger sample available and the relevance of the
question being answered.
The variable measuring labour market flexibil-
ity varies from 0 to 10, and is higher for more flexi-
ble labour markets. It is the answer of managers to
the following question: ‘’What is the flexibility of
enterprises to adjust job security and compensa-
tion standards to economic realities: 0 = none at all
to 10 = a great deal’’. We must be concerned with
changes in the question that occurred in 1990 and
than again on 1992. However, the basic interpreta-
tion and the goal of the question remained the
same, which makes one more comfortable in using
and interpreting the results.
To measure the cost of entering and remaining
self-employed I use the ratio of social security con-
tributions paid per self-employed to the nominal
per capita GDP. To construct this variable, the level
of total contributions paid by the self-employed as
reported by the OECD’s Revenue Statistics (code
2300 — total contributions paid by the self-
employed), is divided by the number of self-
employed workers. This is a measure of the level
of contributions per self-employed, and is divided
by the nominal per capita GDP, to give us a mea-
sure of the financial burden imposed on the
self-employed by the social security contributory
system.
Next, I present a detailed definition and sum-
mary features of the data used in this paper.
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Table 1A





GDP per capita Unemployment
rate %
Germany............ 3.745 7.59 0.030 0.019
Austria.............. 4.317 6.25 0.158 0.030 5.31
Belgium............. 3.841 10.69 0.117 0.031 11.35
Canada ............. 6.042 8.74 0.025 0.034 9.47
Spain ............... 3.129 16.96 0.066 0.022 19.52
United States ........ 7.045 6.97 0.053 0.041 6.02
Finland ............. 4.708 8.44 0.053 0.029 10.55
France .............. 3.749 8.89 0.214 0.030 10.75
Greece .............. 3.743 24.15 0.066 8.84
Ireland.............. 5.276 12.07 0.015 0.025 13.63
Italy ................ 3.096 20.80 0.074 0.027 10.29
Japan ............... 5.437 10.53 0.065 0.031 2.89
Norway............. 4.499 5.73 0.058 0.033 4.13
Netherlands ......... 4.054 8.10 0.461 0.029 6.77
Portugal............. 3.589 15.56 0.018 0.018 6.25
United Kingdom ..... 6.749 10.82 0.024 0.027 8.66
Sweden ............. 3.725 6.90 0.073 0.030 4.73
Switzerland ......... 6.976 9.27 0.076 0.037 2.40Sample of 18 countries
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, United States.
Definition of variables
Share of Non-Agricultural Self-employment in
Total Civilian Non-Agricultural Employment
The non-agricultural self-employment divided
by total civilian non-agricultural employment
from the OECD Labour Force Statistics.
Unemployment rate
The unemployment rate from the OECD Main
Economic Indicators.
GDP per capita
The log per capita GDP expressed in constant
1995 prices, from the OECD Main Economic Indica-
tors (millions of national currency units).
Flexibility
The survey question that I use (classified as
2.17 Labour-Cost Flexibility in 1984) asked the re-
spondents: ‘’Flexibility of enterprises to adjust job
security and compensation standards to economic
realities: 0=none at all, to 100=a great deal’’. This
question was changed in 1990 to ‘’Flexibility of
management to adjust employment levels during
difficult periods: 0=low, to 100=high’’. Again in
1992 the question was changed to ‘’Flexibility of
hiring and fire practices by the government: 0=are
too restricted by government, to 100=are flexible
enough’’. From the World Competitiveness Report,
EMF Foundation, Geneva.
Self-employed Workers Social Security Contri-
butions
Social security contributions of the self-
employed divided by nominal GDP per capita.
From the OECD Revenue Statistics and OECD Main
Economic Indicators.
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